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The decade of the 1960's has witnessed a unique phenomenon-
the Motorcycle Explosion. During these years, the motorcycle has
been widely accepted as a means of economical transportation as
well as exciting outdoor recreation. With this acceptance has come
a vast proliferation of motorcycles in this country as evidenced by
the increase in registrations from one-half million in 1960 to almost
two million in 1967.1 Unfortunately, this sharp increase in use has
brought about a corresponding rise in motorcycle accidents and
resulting injuries.2 Due to the inherent vulnerability of the rider
and the potential for high speed, motorcycle accidents result in a
large number of deaths. The ratio of motorcycle fatalities to motor-
cycle registrations is approximately twice as great as the fatality-
registration rate for automobiles.3 Head injury, particularly con-
cussion, is the prime cause of motorcycle fatality.4
In response to the growing carnage on the nation's highways,
Congress in 1966 authorized the Federal Government to initiate a
major campaign to increase highway safety. Fundamental to this
campaign was the Highway Safety Act" which established a three
year federal highway safety program and required the formation
of similar programs on the state level. To encourage state partici-
pation, Congress provided that failure by any state to implement
such an approved program by December 31, 1968, would terminate
all federal funds for the program and reduce the state's federal
1. Motorcycle registrations in 1960 numbered 575,500. U.S. BUREAU
OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1961, at 559 (82d
ed. 1961). The number registered in 1967 was 1,953,000. U.S. BUREAU OF
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1968, at 553 (89th
ed. 1968).
2. A study initiated at the request of the New York Department of
Motor Vehicles stated in a memorandum to the legislature:
The number of accidents involving motorcycles is increasing rapid-
ly. In fact, motorcycle accidents increased by 105% in 1965 as
compared to 1964, while the total registrations of these vehicles
increased by 83%. Fatalities increased by 63.6% and personal in-
jury accidents by 100%.
McKINNmE's 1966 SESSION LAWS OF NEW YORK 2961-62 (1966).
3. The fatality rate for automobiles in 1967 was 5.3 deaths per
10,000 vehicle registrations. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1968, at 560 (89th ed. 1968). The motorcycle
fatality rate for 1966 in Michigan was 12.8 deaths per 10,000 cycle registra-
tions. Mich. State Police, Michigan Motorcycle and Motorscooter Data
1962-1966 (April 12, 1967).
4. "A summary of Department statistics indicates that 89.2% of the
motorcycle accidents result in injury or death and that almost all fatalities
occurring as a result of such accidents involve head injuries." MCKINNEY'S
1966 SESSION LAWS OF NEW YORK 2962 (1966), cited in People v. Car-
michael, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genessee City Ct. 1968) and
People v. Smallwood (N.Y. Monroe Cty. Ct. April 25, 1968).
5. Highway Safety Act of 1966, 23 U.S.C.A. § 401-404 (Supp. 1967).
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highway appropriation by ten per cent. The National Highway
Safety Bureau was charged with implementing the highway safety
program.6 One of the Bureau's initial proposals was to make the
wearing of protective helmets by motorcycle riders mandatory.
This proposal was incorporated by Congress into its formulation of
National Uniform Standards for Highway Safety Programs.7 The
concern for safety in conjunction with the threatened loss of high-
way funds was evidently sufficient to induce state action on these
recommendations. At present, thirty-four states have enacted stat-
utes requiring that helmets be worn," and two states have laws that
require that they be carried with the bike as equipment, but need
not be worn.9
These helmet statutes have produced much litigation in the
past two years challenging their constitutionality. The two recent
cases of People v. Carmichael,10 upholding the validity of such a
statute, and American Motorcycle Association v. Davids,n finding
a similar statute unconstitutional, illustrate the conflicting results
reached by the state courts. The questions raised in these recent
challenges to the constitutionality of such statutes are whether
this type of requirement is a valid exercise of the police power of
6. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1404 (Supp. 1967).
7. H.R. Doc. No. 138, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1967) states: The
program shall provide as a minimum that: each motorcycle operator wears
an approved safety helmet ... [e]ach motorcycle passenger wears an
approved safety helmet...
8. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 138 (Supp. 1967); AmZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-
964 (Supp. 1968); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5 (Supp. 1968); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-289e (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 317.981 (Supp.
1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1673 (1967); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 311-23
(Supp. 1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-761A (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch.
951/2, § 189c (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2246 (Supp.
1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-574b (Supp. 1967); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 189.285(2) (Supp. 1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1371 (Supp.
1967); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7 (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 169.974 subd. 4 (Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 302.020 (Supp. 1967);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:29b (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:8-1
(Supp. 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-18-55.1 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 381 subd.6(Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-140.2 (Supp.
1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-48 (Supp. 1967); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
4511.53 (Baldwin Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 40-105 (Supp.
1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.443 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 625.1
(Supp. 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-10.1-4 (Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 46-631 (Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59.944 (Supp. 1967); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 670lc-3 (Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 1256 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.37.-1 (Supp. 1967); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 347.485 (Supp. 1968); NEB. LEG. BILL. 798-7 (1967).
9. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1703(2)a (Supp. 1967); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 9.2358 (Supp. 1968) as amended Pub. Act. No. 141 (June 2, 1968).
10. 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genesee Cty. Ct. 1968).
11. 9 Mich. App. 655, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1968).
the state to protect the public welfare, as opposed to an unreason-
able infringement of individual liberty and the right to the free
use of one's property; and, whether the standards set in such stat-
utes are too vague and indefinite to be enforceable. If either of the
above challenges to this type of statute is valid, then fundamental
rights are being denied by the states without due process of law as
provided for in the ninth 12 and fourteenth amendments' 13 to the
United States Constitution.
In analyzing the controversy presented by these statutes and
cases, this Comment will consider the following questions: What are
the traditional limits of the police power of the state; whether in
this instance such limits have been exceeded; whether, under our
system of constitutionally limited governmental power, there is not
some fundamental point at which only the individual himself can
decide what course of conduct he will follow in his own protection;
and finally, whether individual conduct which affects no other per-
son but the actor can be said to affect the public welfare.
The value of protective headgear to the individual rider or
passenger, in case of an accident, is generally recognized. There
is, nevertheless, some conflict as to whether a state can demand
upon penal sanctions that helmets be worn. An ever widening
range of human activity is becoming regulated by all levels of gov-
ernment as it becomes increasingly obvious that only government
has the ability to effectively deal with the complex problems of
modem living. The area of safety on the highways is eminently
qualified for some degree of governmental control; in this instance,
however, it may be that the traditional limits of the police power
have been unjustifiably over-extended in an attempt to achieve a
beneficial result.
Because the police power of a state is used to protect the pub-
lic welfare, it is the least limitable of the powers of government.
4
Such limits as apply to its exercise can be determined only in the
context of the subject matter over which the power is being exer-
cised.15 The police power of the state is the power vested in the
legislature to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with or with-
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX provides:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
13. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
14. See cases cited at 16 Am. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law § 263 n.12
(1964).
15. Panhandle Co. v. Highway Comm'n., 294 U.S. 613, 622 (1935); Hall
v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239
U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1915).
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out penalties, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge
to provide the greatest welfare of the State. 16 Regulation to pro-
mote the public welfare is not confined to the suppression of what
is offensive, disorderly, or unsanitary, but extends to the protection
of public safety, public health, public morals and the insuring to
each individual an uninterrupted enjoyment of the rights and priv-
ileges conferred upon him by law.17 "Insofar as the police power is
utilized by a State, the means employed to effect its exercise can
be neither arbitrary nor oppressive, but must bear a real and sub-
stantial relation to an end which is public."'
The ancient maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use
your own that you do not injure that of another) has often been
cited as one of the essential bases of the police power.19 In this
regard, the protection of the public welfare through past applica-
tions of the police power had been limited to instances where one
individual's conduct adversely affected others. The helmet stat-
utes, if valid, represent an extension of the limits of the police
power to include the regulation of an individual's conduct where
he alone could be adversely affected.
HELMET STATUTES
An investigation of state highway safety laws indicates legis-
lative concern with three basic areas of motorcycle safety: pre-
scribing required conduct of the individual motorcyclist regarding
helmets; setting of standards which the helmets must meet; and
establishing the consequences for failure to comply. The conduct
most frequently required is wearing a protective helmet while the
motorcycle is in operation.20 This provision usually applies to
both the rider and passenger. Certain states have, however,
qualified this requirement by making it applicable only to re-
stricted licensee classes, for example, minor operators, 21 or by
16. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n., 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936);
Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1928); McKinley v. Reilly,
96 Ariz. 176, 393 P.2d 268, 270 (1964); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 94 Ariz. 1, 381
P.2d 554, 559 (1963).
17. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429 (1935);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52,
58-59 (1915); California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199
U.S. 306, 318-19 (1905).
18. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITEID STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1964).
19. See cases cited at 16 AM. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law § 267 n.10
(1964).
20. Statutes cited note 8 supra.
21. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-18-55.1 (Supp. 1967).
exempting its application when the motorcyclist is riding on private
trails22 or in a police permitted parade or exhibition.28  Two states
have chosen to approach the problem by requiring that the motor-
cycle be equipped with helmets which need not be worn.24 Still
other statutes require that ownership of a protective helmet be
proved in order to obtain a motorcycle operator's license25 and
provide that any motorcycle rider may be stopped and detained by
law enforcement personnel for the purpose of determining
whether his helmet meets minimum standards of safety.2
Formulating these helmet safety standards is the second area
on which the legislatures have focused. Legislation has taken two
approaches; the first is aimed at the manufacturers of motorcycle
helmets and the second at the individual rider. State regulations
setting minimum standards for helmets, when applied to dealers
or manufacturers, appear to pose no constitutional problems. It
has always been within the police powers of the state to tell one
individual that he must perform certain requirements or follow
specified standards where his conduct affects the safety or welfare
of another individual.2 7  In this situation, the conduct of manu-
facturers and dealers clearly affects the safety of the motorcyclist
who relies on the helmet to protect his life. This approach is sim-
ilar to that by which states have regulated industrial safety stand-
ards for the protection of the workers. 28 State regulation of auto-
mobile safety devices such as lights, horns, and shatter-proof wind-
shields is another example of requiring a manufacturer to conform
to stated standards for the protection of the public.29
The second approach which has been used is the setting of
standards for helmets which apply to the individual rider. Such
standards may be established either directly by the legislature in a
statute or by an administrative agency in a regulation. Unfortu-
nately, only a very few states set down in a statute addressed to
22. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 40-105 (Supp. 1967).
23. N.Y. VFi. & TRAP. LAW § 381 subd. 6 (Supp. 1968); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-21-48 (Supp. 1967).
24. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1703(2)a (Supp. 1967); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 9.2358 (Supp. 1968) as amended Pub. Act No. 141 (June 12, 1968). The
original Michigan enactment required wearing of a helmet. The present
form was adopted after the American Motorcycle Ass'n. case was decided.
25. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 138 (Supp. 1967).
26. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701c-3 (Supp. 1967).
27. DeCarlo v. Jefferson County Board of Health, 6 Div. 628, 150 So.
2d 374, 384 (Ala. 1963); In re Adoption of Rules and Regulations Relative
to Driver Training Schools, 165 N.E.2d 834, 837 (Ohio C.P. Franklin Cty.
1958); Burks v. Poppy Const. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313, 317 (1962).
28. W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 159 Misc. 124, 286 N.Y.S. 242,
modified, 271 N.Y. 1, 2 N.E.2d 22, aff'd, 299 U.S. 515, rehearing denied, 301
U.S. 714 (1936). See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 18; N.Y. LABOR LAW § 200
(1965); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 376 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 25-2
(Supp. 1967).
29. See, e.g., N.Y. VE. & TRAT. LAW §§ 375-384 (Supp. 1968); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 801-847 (Supp. 1967).
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the motorcyclist complete specifications and standards that the hel-
met is required to meet.80 This would be the most desirable
method since it adequately meets the problem of giving the
affected individuals notice of what is expected of them. Some
states have statutes enumerating isolated specifications such as the
helmet's having a neck or chin strap,31 being reflectorized on the
sides, 2 or bearing an identification of the make and model desig-
nation.3
The approach more frequently adopted in the statutes requires
that helmets either meet the standards established by, or are of a
type approved by, a designated administrative agency or official.
8 4
Of the twenty-seven states that have adopted this administrative
approach, only nine have adopted the additional requirement that
the list of specificiations established or helmets approved be pub-
lished and made available to the motorcycling public.8 5 Other
30. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 139 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 40-105 (Supp. 1967).
31. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 139 (Supp. 1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:
29b (Supp. 1967); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 381 subd. 6 (Supp. 1968);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.53 (Baldwin Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47, § 40-105 (Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-631 (Supp. 1967); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1256 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.37-1
(Supp. 1967).
32. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 381 subd. 6 (Supp. 1968); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 31-10.1-4 (Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1256
(Supp. 1968).
33. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 139 (Supp. 1967).
34. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1703 (2) (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-289e (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1673 (1967); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 49-761A (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 952, § 1189c (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2246 (Supp. 1968); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 8-574b (Supp. 1967); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189; 285(3) (Supp.
1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1371 (Supp. 1967); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 90, § 7 (Supp. 1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2358 (Supp. 1968);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.974 subd. 4 (Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 302.020
(Supp. 1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:29b (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 64-18-55.1 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 381 subd. 6
(Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-140.2 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 39-21-48 (Supp. 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.53 (Baldwin
Supp. 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.443 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75,
§ 625.1 (Supp. 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-10.1-4 (Supp. 1967); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 46-631 (Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59.944 (Supp.
1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1256 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 46.37.-1 (Supp. 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.485 (Supp. 1968).
35. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-289e (Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 49-761A (1967); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.285(3) (Supp. 1968);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:29b (Supp. 1967); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 381 subd. 6 (Supp. 1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.53 (Baldwin
Supp. 1968); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-631 (Supp. 1967); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 6701c-3 (Supp. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.37.-i (Supp.
1967).
statutes purport to adopt Federal Government standards,86 either as
set by the Department of Transportation or as stated in the High-
way Safety Act.3 7  However, since there really are no standards
set down in that act,8 this type of provision fails to inform the
rider of what type helmet is expected.3 9 One statute requires that
the helmet conform to the federal standards "and to the extent
there are no such federal standards, to the safety standards promul-
gated by the United States of America Standards Institute."'
4
The third area of legislation is establishing the consequences
for failure to comply with the provisions of the statutes. All of
these laws impose penal sanctions, but in most states violation is
punishable only as a summary offense for which a specified fine
may be levied. Five states consider violation of the statute a mis-
demeanor.41 One state deems the failure of an individual to take
steps to protect himself from injury so serious an infraction that
it bears a penalty of up to 180 days in jail or at hard labor.42 Three
states have provided that failure to comply with the helmet require-
ment is not to be considered negligence or contributory negligence
per se and that violation of the requirement is not to be used as
evidence in any resulting civil action.
43
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING STATUTES
A. Public Welfare Threatened
The arguments favoring these statutes are based on the con-
tention that the public welfare is endangered by the unhelmeted
rider. Courts upholding helmet statutes have relied on one or a
combination of propositions based on this theory. In State v. Lom-
bardi,4 the court suggests that the injured rider will become a
burden on society and holds that the legislature is not "powerless
to prohibit individuals from pursuing a course of conduct which
could conceivably result in their becoming public charges. ' 4  In
36. FLA STAT. ANN. § 317.981 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
95 , § 189c (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.443 (1967).
37. 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-404 (Supp. 1967).
38. Id. § 404(b) (2) reads in part: The National Highway Safety Ad-
visory Committee ... is authorized ... to review, prior to issuance,
standards proposed to be issued ...
39. See discussion p. 114 accompanying note 89 infra.
40. ORa REV. STAT. § 483.443 (1967). The U.S.A.S.I. Standard Z-90.1
is not a testing operation. Helmets can meet the standard specified, but
cannot be Z-90 approved. The standard requires a double impact pro-
cedure with both blows applied at the same location of the helmet.
41. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 141 (Supp. 1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-574c
(Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-140.2 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47, § 40-105 (Supp. 1967); Tmx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701c-3
(Supp. 1967).
42. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 141 (Supp. 1967).
43. GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1673 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-140.2
(Supp. 1967); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.53 (Baldwin Supp. 1967).
44. 241 A.2d 625 (R.I. 1968).
45. Id. at 627; accord People v. Smallwood (N.Y. Monroe Cty. Ct.
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addition to being a potential case for public economic assistance,
the disabled rider will be unable to add his fair share to the pro-
ductivity of society. On this point, the court in the Carmichael
case46 stated: "It is to the interest of the state to have strong,
robust, healthy citizens capable of self-support, of bearing arms,
and of adding to the resources of the country.
' '47
It is suggested in Bisenius v. Karns,48 a Wisconsin helmet law
case, that "[t]he state has an interest in the health and welfare of
each of its citizens, no matter how reckless he may be.' '49 The
courts relying on this proposition cite the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Holden v. Hardy,50 a case upholding the
validity of a maximum work hour law for miners, which states:
"The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and when
the individual health, safety and welfare are sacrificed or neglected,
the state must suffer."51
Similar reasoning has been used to justify common law and
statutory attempts to prohibit suicide. 2 Other courts find the
public welfare threatened by the burden that the injured rider
places on his family and his employer.51 Finally, the courts hold
that the increased severity of injury due to failure to wear helmets
will be reflected in rising insurance rates for all motorists. 4
B. Direct Benefit to Others
In contrast to those benefits accruing to the individual cyclist
and thus to the whole of society, some courts have found in helmet
statutes a legislative intent to confer direct benefits to certain
classes of citizens, specifically, highway users. Since the rider is in
April 25, 1968); People v. Newhouse, 55 Misc. 2d 1064, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713
(Ithaca City Ct. 1968); Bisensius v. Karns, No. 124423 (Wis. Cir. Ct. May
14, 1968).
46. People v. Carmichael, 56 Misc. 2d 388, N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genesee Cty.
Ct. 1968).
47. Id at 391, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
48. No. 124423 (Wis. Cir. Ct. May 14, 1968).
49. Id. at 3; accord People v. Smallwood (N.Y. Monroe Cty. Ct. April
25, 1968).
50. 169 U.S. 366 (1897).
51. Id. at 397.
52. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.80.020 (1961); North Carolina
v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961). For a general discussion see
Schulman, Suicide and Suicide Prevention: A Legal Analysis, 54 A.B.A.J.
855 (1968).
53. City of Hutchison v. Silvey, No. CR 8081 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11,
1967); People v. Smallwood (N.Y. Monroe Cty. Ct. April 25, 1968); Bisen-
sius v. Karns, No. 124423 (Wis. Cir. Ct. May 14, 1968).
54. Bisensius v. Karns, No. 124423 (Wis. Cir. Ct. May 14, 1968).
an exposed position, it is often suggested by the courts that flying
stones or bugs might strike the unhelmeted rider's head causing
loss of control thereby endangering pedestrians or other motor-
ists.55 Since some states require reflectorization, it is also con-
tended that wearing a helmet makes the rider more visible to other
highway users and thereby less of a menace to them.5 6 Finally, a
helmet requirement is said to directly protect motorists who might
become involved in auto-motorcycle accidents from being charged
with negligent homicide.
5 7
C. Power to Control Use of Highways
The position that the use of the public highways is a privilege
not a natural right is a third justification for the helmet laws as
a valid exercise of the state's police power. 8 Even though the use
of the highways may be only a conditional privilege subject to
state control, the state cannot exercise this power arbitrarily.5 9
The legislature must still determine that the public welfare is en-
dangered and must reasonably exercise the police powers to meet
that public need."" The mounting death toll on the highways,
probably in part due to an increase in cycle use, is cited as a
reason for legislative action.' Such action is needed, the argument
55. People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc. 2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (Erie
Cty. Ct. 1967); People v. Smallwood (N.Y. Monroe Cty. Ct. April 25, 1968);
People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (Buffalo City
Ct. 1967); People v. Newhouse, 55 Misc. 2d 1064, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715
(Ithaca City Ct. 1968); State v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625, 627 (R.I. 1968);
Bisensius v. Karns, No. 124423 (Wis. Cir. Ct. May 14, 1968).
56. People v. Smallwood (N.Y. Monroe Cty. Ct. April 25, 1968).
57. Brief for Appellee at 8, American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Davids, 9
Mich. App. 655, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1968).
58. City of Hutchison v. Silvey, No. CR 8081 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11,
1967); Commonwealth v. Howie, Mass., 238 N.E.2d 373, 374 (1968); State
v. Edwards, No. 582370 (Minn. Minneapolis Mun. Ct. Aug. 10, 1968); People
v. Schmidt, 54 Misc. 2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290, 293 (Erie Cty. Ct. 1967);
People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 283 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (Buffalo City
Ct. 1967); Bisensius v. Karns, No. 124423 (Wis. Cir. Ct. May 14, 1968).
59. See Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963);
Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953); Ber-
berian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869 (R.I. 1958). See also State v. Moseng,
254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6 (1959); E. FISHER, VEHICLE TRAFFIC LAW 71-74
(1961).
60. See cases cited at 16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 281 n.6
(1964).
61. City of Hutchison v. Silvey, No. CR 8081 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11,
1967); People v. Smallwood (N.Y. Monroe Cty. Ct. April 25, 1968); People
v. Carmichael, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931, 935 (Genesee Cty. Ct.
1968); People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc. 2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (Erie Cty.
Ct. 1967); People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800
(Buffalo City Ct. 1967); Bisensius v. Karns, No. 124423 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
May 14, 1968). See generally McKINNEY'S 1966 SESSION LAWS OF NEW
Yoiux 2961-62 (1966).
Total highway deaths rose from 38,000 in 1960 to 53,000 in 1966. U.S.
BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1968, at
57 (89th ed. 1968).
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continues, because the public in general has a tendency to minimize
the danger involved in the use of any motor vehicle (the "it can't
happen to me" attitude is all too prevalent in American today).62
Thus the courts feel that helmet statutes are valid since the legis-
latures, as guardians of the public interest, must act to lessen the
severity of injury to even the foolhardy who otherwise would not
act to protect themselves.63 Considering the large proportion of
automobile injuries which involve cranial damage, would it not
seem logical that states also require auto drivers to wear protective
helmets? No state, however, has imposed a penalty for an auto
driver's failing to wear a helmet.
6 4
D. Equipment Regulation
The final contention favoring helmet laws sees them as simply
equipment regulations, similar to those requiring seat belts and
other safety devices, therefore no problem of individual liberty is
involved.65 While, however, nearly every state requires that new
automobiles be equipped with seat belts, 6 no state has gone so far
as to demand upon penal sanctions that they must be worn.6 7
Requiring a manufacturer to equip the vehicles he produces with
devices protective of the general motoring public is a traditionally
valid exercise of the police power.6" This requirement is sub-
stantially different from requiring an individual to do something
62. See City of Hutchison v. Silvey, No. CR 8081 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec.
11, 1967); Note, Automobile Safety: A Diagnosis of an Epidemic, 23 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 327 (1966).
63. People v. Carmichael, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931, 936
(Genesee Cty. Ct. 1968); People v. Smallwood (N.Y. Monroe Cty. Ct.
April 25, 1968).
64. See State v. Eitel, No. 68M-7013 (Fla. Magis. Ct. Palm Beach
Cty. Aug. 27, 1968).
65. City of Hutchison v. Silvey, No. CR 8081 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11,
1967). See also Defense Research Inst., The Seat Belt Defense (1968);
American Seat Belt Council Inc., Chronological History of Automobile
Seat Belts (1964).
A recent New York decision dismissing a helmet prosecution was
based on the view that the statute was merely an equipment regulation.
The defendant, a non-resident motorcyclist, had complied with the equip-
ment and registration requirements of his state which had no mandatory
helmet statute. The court, therefore, refused to apply the New York re-
quirement. People v. Driscoll, 56 Misc. 2d 220, 288 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Nassau
Cty. Dist. Ct. 1968).
66. See, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 27309 (Supp. 1966); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 383 (Supp. 1968); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 347.48 (Supp. 1967).
67. See State v. Babbs, No. 80-330 (Fla. Martin Cty. Ct. Sept. 5, 1968);
State v. Eitel, No. 68M-7013 (Fla. Magis. Ct. Palm Beach Cty. Aug. 27,
1968); City of Seattle v. Zektzer (Wash. Seattle Mun. Ct. 1967).
68. Statutes cited note 29 supra.
protective of his welfare alone. This distinction, it is suggested, is
crucial and is the basis of the counter argument that the helmet
laws are unconstitutional.
ARGUMENTS OPPOSING STATUTES
A. Infringement of Individual Liberty
The central argument challenges such statute's constitution-
ality on the grounds that only the individual and not the public
welfare is endangered. Hence, the state should not invoke its po-
lice powers.0 9 Is this not a restatement of one of the fundamental
principles of democracy that the individual is to be the master of
of his own fate? The court in City of Seattle v. Zektzer,T a recent
Washington helmet case, held that:
Freedom of choice, if that choice does not affect the public
welfare, includes the right to make what the majority be-
lieves to be the wrong or unintelligent choice, as well as
the right or intelligent choice. For if the majority can set
itself up to judge, in matters of individual welfare, be-
tween right and wrong, and enforce those judgments with
criminal sanctions, then all areas of personal liberty will
be jeopardized.
71
Similarly, the court in American Motorcycle Association v.
David7 2 claimed that to allow this type of regulation is to open the
door to an unlimited benevolent paternalism of government which
would surely be inimical to our democratic way of life and our
constitutionally protected liberties.
73
In answer to the position that the public welfare is affected
when a disabled individual is not able to contribute his share of
69. State v. Babbs, No. 80-330 (Fla. Martin Cty. Ct. Sept. 5, 1968);
State v. Eitel, No. 68M-7013 (Fla. Magis Ct. Palm Beach Cty. Aug. 27,
1968); Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 208 So. 2d 423 (La. Ct. App.
1968); American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Davids, 9 Mich. App. 655, 158 N.W.2d
72 (Ct. App. 1968); City of Seattle v. Zektzer (Wash. Seattle Mun. Ct.
1967); Op. Att'y. Gen., N.M., No. 66-15 (Feb. 1, 1966).
70. Seattle Mun. Ct. Wash. 1967.
71. Id. at 5. The court also quotes the following:
[T]he police power does not undertake to protect the individual
against his own acts, partly because that would involve an in-
quisitorial control over private life and conduct both intolerable and
unenforceable, partly because the police power ought not and is
not intended to be a substitute for individual self-control and re-
sponsibility but finds its proper sphere in guarding against evils
and dangers beyond the control of him whom they threaten.
The right to choose one course of action even to the extent of in-
curring risks, where others are not concerned, is a part of in-
dividual liberty ...
E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
§ 155 (1904).
72. 9 Mich. App. 655, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1968).
73. 158 N.W.2d at 75; accord, State v. Babbs, No. 80-330 (Fla. Martin
Cty. Ct. Sept. 5, 1968); State v. Eitel, No. 68M-7013 (Fla. Magis. Ct. Palm
Beach Cty. Aug. 27, 1968).
Such paternalism of government would be acceptable if limited to
minors since the State has traditionally fulfilled the role of parens patriae.
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productivity to society, it is argued that the state exists for the
people and not vice versa.74 The United States Supreme Court
responded to the productivity argument in Lochner v. New York,7"
a case in which a regulation setting maximum work hours for
bakers was found to be an unconstitutional exercise of police
power:
It is also urged, pursuing the same line of argument that it
is to the interest of the state that its population should be
strong and robust, and therefore any legislation which may
be said to tend to make people healthy must be valid as
health laws, enacted under the police power. If this be
a valid argument and a justification for this kind of legis-
lation, it follows that the protection of the Federal Consti-
tution from undue interference with liberty of person and
freedom of contract is visionary, wherever the law is
sought to be justified as a valid exercise of the police
power.76
Two areas in which legislatures have apparently acted to pro-
tect the individual from himself are in labor laws setting maximum
working hours for employees and in medical vaccination laws. The
maximum working hour laws in dangerous industries, such as min-
ing or smelting, have been suggested as a use of the police power to
protect the individual rather than the public welfare analogous to
the helmet laws.7 7 While such labor statutes are addressed to both
the employer and employee, the sanctions involved there have been
applied only against employers.78 Regulating individual, that is,
the employer's conduct by such labor statutes is clearly distinguish-
able from the type of regulation sought to be imposed by helmet
laws. The labor statutes involved the governing of individual con-
duct for the protection of the welfare of others, in this case, em-
ployees, which is precisely the purpose of the police power. The
helmet laws, on the other hand, involve regulation of the individual
for his own protection. Another analogy suggested in support of
the mandatory helmet laws is the valid exercise of the police powers
74. See Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776).
75. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
76. Id. at 60.
77. People v. Smallwood (N.Y. Monroe Cty. Ct. April 25, 1968); Bisen-
sius v. Karns, No. 124423 (Wis. Cir. Ct. May 14, 1968). See Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); In re Martin 157 Cal. 51, 106 P. 235 (1910);
State v. Safeway Stores, 106 Mont. 182, 76 P.2d 81 (1938); Long Island R.R.
v. New York Dep't. of Labor, 256 N.Y. 498, 177 N.E. 17 (1931). Contra,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 58
P. 1071 (1899); State v. Henry, 37 N.M. 536, 25 P.2d 204 (1933).
78. American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Davids, 9 Mich. App. 655, 158 N.W.
2d 72, 76 (Ct. App. 1968); Martinez v. Johnson, 61 Nev. 125, 119 P.2d 880
(1942); State v. Thompson, 15 Wyo. 136, 87 P. 433 (1906).
to require compulsory vaccination.79 However, that use of police
power has been distinguished by the fact that the public health is
sought to be protected by preventing spread of disease, and not
just that of the individual who may be compelled against his wishes
to submit to such treatment.
80
B. Legislative Intent Solely to Protect Rider
Courts which have struck down helmet laws find a clear and
single legislative purpose in these statutes: to afford the rider an
added degree of protection in case of mishaps. This view tends to
deny that such statutes act to directly benefit other users of the
highways. State v. Babbs8' suggests that the problem of loss of
control due to flying stones or bugs was not intended to be met by
these laws:
It is said that the wearing of a mask and helmet might well
prevent a stone or bug from hitting a cyclist in the face,
causing him to lose control of his cycle, swerve into the
oncoming traffic lane and cause a grievous accident. This
Court is of the opinion that to uphold the statute under
such reasoning would torture logic beyond its limits."2
In searching for legislative intent, Courts have no doubt
realized that the goal of protecting the public could be achieved
without helmet statutes. Requiring all motorcycles to be equipped
with windshields would probably protect the rider from flying
objects more effectively and with less infringement of personal
liberty than the helmet requirement. Where a state is faced with
choosing between two alternative methods of accomplishing a valid
legislative purpose, in this case the loss of control problem, it must
select the course that least restricts fundamental personal lib-
erties. 83
Similar reasoning has been raised in answer to the contention
79. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Daniel v. Putnam County,
113 Ga. 570, 38 S.E. 980 (1901); Stull v. Reber, 215 Pa. 156, 64 A. 419
(1906).
80. Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 208 So. 2d 423, 426 (La. Ct.
App. 1968).
81. No. 80-330 (Fla. Martin Cty. Ct. Sept. 5, 1968).
82. Id. at 2, accord, State v. Eitel, No. 68M-7013 (Fla. Magis. Ct. Palm
Beach Cty. Aug. 27, 1968); American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Davids, 9 Mich.
App. 655, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1968).
83. On this point, several helmet cases cite the language used by the
United States Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960):
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose.
That decision struck down a statute requiring teachers to list every or-
ganization, of any sort, to which they belong. It was felt that this was too
drastic a means to accomplish the goal of a loyal teacher corps since
loyalty oaths were valid for this purpose.
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that reflectorized helmets make the rider more visible on the high-
way. If improved visibility is the desired goal of the legislature,
such a result could be more legitimately accomplished by requir-
ing that reflectorized markings be worn, but not necessarily on a
helmet. That the purpose of these statutes is clearly and simply
restricted to protection the rider is also urged to negate the idea
that their purpose is to protect other motorists from charges of
criminal negligence or from increased insurance costs. 4
C. Detrimental Effect of Helmet
The Court in Everhardt v. City of New Orleans"' raises another
point to invalidate a mandatory helmet law. Rather than being
beneficial, it is contended that the wearing of a crash helmet tends
to impair the rider's vision and hearing. This impairment makes
the rider less aware of what is occurring around him and, therefore,
more of a menace to others on the highways.8
D. Statutes Too Vague and Indefinite to be Enforced
The final argument posed in opposition to helmet laws is that
the statutory standards are too vague and indefinite to inform the
cyclist of what is required of him. 7 It must be remembered that
these statutes are penal in nature and must be strictly construed.
If it can, therefore, be shown that the standards are not sufficiently
clear or available to the motorcyclist, then conviction for violation
of such a statute would constitute deprivation of liberty without
due process of law. 8 The statutes that provide definitive helmet
specificiations are obviously not subject to such a challenge. It
would appear just as obvious that those statutes which purport to
take as their standards those of the Highway Safety Act are com-
84. City of Seattle v. Zektzer (Wash. Seattle Mun. Ct. 1967).
85. 208 So. 2d 423 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
86. Id. at 427-28.
87. State v. Babbs, No. 80-330 (Fla. Martin Cty. Ct. Sept 5, 1968);
State v. Eitel, No. 68M-7013 (Fla. Magis. Ct. Palm Beach Cty. Aug. 27,
1968).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ...
"The effect of the clause entitling an accused to know the nature and
cause of the accusation against him commences with the statutes fixing or
declaring offenses. It adopts the general rule of the common law that
such statutes are not to be construed to embrace offenses which are not
within their intention and terms." THE CONSTnUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1004-05 (1964). See United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,
264 F. 218 (E.D. Mo. 1920), aff'd. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
pletely open to such a challenge; for, as was pointed out earlier,
that act established a general program of highway safety but set
no specific standards at all.89 The usual provision is, however, to
leave the standard setting to the administrative agency concerned
with highway safety on the state level.90 This statutory approach
will meet the requirements of clarity and definiteness only if the
administrative regulations establish complete and specific standards
which are made available to motorcyclists.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, the police powers of the state have only been
applied when the public welfare was endangered. State exercise
of these powers to regulate an individual's conduct when he
alone is threatened is, at the least, unusual. If the legislature is
allowed to usurp what is essentially a matter of individual concern,
and if this usurpation is condoned by the courts would not a dan-
gerous precedent be set thereby?
The traditional limits of the police power allow the state to
regulate only that conduct of an individual which adversely affects
others. These limits recognize that individual conduct which
which affects no other person but the actor cannot be said to en-
danger the public welfare, health, safety or morals and, therefore,
such conduct is not properly regulated by the State under the
police powers. Since the wearing or not wearing of a helmet
constitutes conduct affecting only the individual motorcyclist, it is
submitted that the police powers cannot validly be invoked to
demand that helmets be worn. It is further urged that application
of the police powers in this context is not just invalid but un-
constitutional, since an individual has a fundamental right to deter-
mine for himself whether or not he wishes to act to protect him-
self-so long as he alone is endangered.
The same result, protection of the motorcyclist by wearing a
helmet, could be accomplished by a more traditional use of the
police power. Requiring motorcycle manufacturers and dealers to
include and sell, as original equipment with the motorcycle, an
approved helmet for the rider and any passenger, is an acceptable
approach to the problem. Regulation of the manufacturer's con-
duct would be protective of the public welfare by providing the
motorcyclist with a means to increase his safety. This approach is
similar to various seat belt enactments and does not involve any
infringement of individual liberty. While this method would not
guarantee that the motorcyclist would wear his helmet, it would
at least insure his having an opportunity to decide for himself
whether or not he will act to protect himself.
BRUCE I. KOGAN
89. 23 U.S.C.A. § 404(b) (2) (Supp. 1967).
90. Statutes cited note 34 supra.
